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THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE IN THE CLASSROOM 
AND THE COURT: AN EPIC STRUGGLE OVER THE 
MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has been at odds with 
itself for many years over what the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment 1 does and does not protect. particularly 
when it comes to speech within public schools. As part of this 
debate, a hot topic throughout the decade has been what the 
Establishment Clause means for the Pledge of Allegiance and 
its recitation in public schools. As the legal community 
anxiously awaits the Ninth Circuit's decision in the latest 
challenge to the Pledge,2 the United States Supreme Court 
must prepare to make a final determination of what impact, if 
any, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has on 
voluntary teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by 
public school students. 
Unlike its predecessor,:3 the pending litigation, Newdow u. 
Congress, 4 appears procedurally sound, which will require the 
Court to make a merits-based decision regarding the Pledge. 
With two of the most vocal Pledge proponents now removed 
from the bench, an in-depth analysis into the Establishment 
1. U.S. CONS'!'. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law resp"cting an 
cstahlishment of reli;.;ion. or prohibiting the fn•e l'Xercis<' thereof: or abridging tbl' 
frppdom of sjwech. or of the pn;ss: or tlw right of the peop]p pcaceabh· to assemhiP. and 
to pl'lition tlw Uovernnwnt for a redress of grievances." (emphasis added)). 
2. N<·wdow v. Cong .. :38:1 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (i<:.D. Cal. 2005). sub nom. Nl•wdow v. 
Rio Linda. No. ();)-172n7 (9th Cir. 2007). When this Comment was last revisc·d in April 
200:-l. the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet delivered an opinion in this case. 
Until the Supreme Court determines the merits of the constitutional question 
surrounding the PleclgP of Alh•giance. however, this Comnwnt remains relevant to tlw 
issue at large. <'\'en if not in thP context of Ncu·drJlc u. Cun;.;rcs8. 
:l. Elk Cmve Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, fi42 U.S. 1 (2004). 
-1. Nc1cdow, :3:-1:1 F. Supp. 2cl at 1229, suiJ nom. Nc>wdow v. f{io Linda. No. OR-
1 /2i17 (9th Cir. 2007). 
281 
282 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2008 
Clause jurisprudence of the Court's two newcomers 1s 
particularly needed in order to predict how the Court may 
decide this issue. This Comment seeks to conduct such an 
analysis to predict how not only the new justices would vote, 
but how the entire Court would rule on a challenge to the 
Pledge of Allegiance's constitutionality. 
While the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and retired Justice 
O'Connor are no longer members of the Court, their 
concurrences in the 2004 Pledge of Allegiance case Elk Grove 
Unified School District v. Newdowfi have not become moot; 
rather they represent crucial pieces of the Court's Pledge 
jurisprudence. As the Court's most prominent insights into 
modern post-Barnette Pledge jurisprudence, the Elk Grove 
concurrences are possible trend-setting opinions, especially for 
the Court's newest justices, and must be analyzed accordingly. 
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
arguably failed to provide clear standards and analytical 
frameworks for evaluating constitutional challenges. Several 
justices have noticed these problems m the current 
jurisprudence. 
In Justice Clarence Thomas's Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow!i concurrence, he stated that Lee v. 
Weisman7 "adopted an expansive definition of 'coercion' that 
cannot be defended however one decides the 'difficult question' 
of '[w]hether and how th[e Establishment] Clause should 
constrain state action under the Fourteenth Amendment."'8 
Justice Thomas further stated that the problems with the 
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence "run far deeper 
than Lee,"9 concluding that "our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray." 10 And Justice Thomas is 
not alone in this regard. Justice Antonin Scalia has reached a 
<1. Elli (;nH·c. ii4:2 U S. al 1 H-:l:i. :3:3-44. 
6. Id. at 1: infm Section lll.D. 
7. iiOEi U.S. fi77 (1992): infra Section III.B. 
H. Elk Gron•. fi-1:2 U.S. at 4fi (Thomas. ,J., concurring) (quoting Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris. p,;l(; US (i:l9, (i7H (2002) (Thomas, ,J., concurring) (alternation in Ellc 
Grove)). 
9. Jd. 
10. Rosenberger v. ]{ector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., filS U.S. 819, 861 (199fi) 
(Thomas .• J., concurring). 
2] THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 
similar finding in his bench opinions: 
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly 
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly 
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children .... 
Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not 
fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee u. Weisman 
conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also 
declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, 
however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting ,Justices 
have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through 
the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly), 
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. 11 
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Every constitutional test that the Court has set forth to 
guide Establishment Clause analyses, such as the infamous 
test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 12 has been known to give 
unpredictable results. For this reason and others, many have 
started to think that maybe Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, 
former Justice O'Connor, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist 
were right-it is time "to begin the process of rethinking the 
Establishment Clause." 1:1 
B. Objectives 
This Comment analyzes the sitting Court's likely Pledge of 
Allegiance jurisprudence by looking at past opinions and 
current trends to predict how the Court would rule on the 
latest Newdow-initiated Pledge litigation, which is pending 
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 14 Section II provides 
the proper context for this discussion by recounting how the 
Pledge of Allegiance came about, including its drafting, 
adoption, legislative history, and subsequent amendments. 
Section III examines the Supreme Court's Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence and its application to a recent case 
challenging the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance, 
while Section IV examines the congressional response. Section 
V then examines the current legislation and pending litigation 
11. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Frel' Sch. Dist .. :iOH U.S. :JH4. :198 
(199:1) (Scalia, .J., concurring) (citation omitt.Pd). 
12. 40:3 U.S. 602 (1971); infra Section Ill. B. 
18. Elk Groue, fi42 U.S. at 4fi (Thomas .• J.. concurring). 
14. Ncwdow. :JH:i F. Supp. 2d at 1229. sub nom. NPwdow v. l{io Linda. No. 05-
17257 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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on these matters. Section VI reviews both the legislative record 
and the independent record of the sitting United States 
Supreme Court justices to determine how a Pledge of 
Allegiance case may be resolved in the current United States 
Supreme Court. Finally. Section VII presents the argument of 
why the Court should uphold school district policies calling for 
voluntary teacher-led recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE 
A former Baptist minister named Francis Bellamy wrote 
the original Pledge of Allegiance in 1892.15 It was first 
published in Youth's Companion, a children-oriented magazine 
that had hired Bellamy shortly after his resignation from his 
religious post. 16 Bellamy also served as chairman of a 
committee of the National Columbian Public School 
Celebration in connection with his service to Youth's 
Companion. 11 As chairman, he was charged to develop a 
program to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Christopher 
Columbus's landing in the Americas.1S Bellamy's program 
centered around a flag-raising ceremony that included his new 
salute to the flag, the "Pledge of Allegiance." 19 During the 
summer months before his flag ceremony, Bellamy successfully 
petitioned President Benjamin Harrison and Congress to issue 
a proclamation in observance of the Columbus Day 
celebration.20 While the Pledge of Allegiance was first recited 
in public schools as part of a Columbus Day Celebration on 
October 12, 1892, thousands of other public and private schools 
participated in the Pledge during the official Columbus Day 
Celebration on October 21, 1892.21 
l!'i. RH'II•\IW .J. ELLIS. To TilE FLAG: TilE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THI·: I'Llmm: OF 
,\LLECI\'iCF: 1. 9 (2005). 
Hi. Id. at 19. 
17. Id.at14. 
1H. ld. 
Hl. Jd. at 17-20. 
20. ld. at 16-17 & nAO. Blellamy was also able to gain thee support of Harrison-
predecl·osor l'residl•nt Gmver Cleveland (who was soon thereafter ell•cted again to the· 
White House in the year of the Columbus Day celebration). ld. at 15. 
21. ld. at 21-2:l. Although Columbus Day was originally planm;d for October 12. 
the congressional n•solution changed the date to Octohn 21. Thus. while a few cities 
celebrated on OctobPr 12 (notably New York), for the majority of towns celebrating 
Columbus Da_1·. schoolchildren rPcited the Pledge for thP first time on Octolwr 21. l 892. 
ld. 
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The Pledge that was adopted in 1892 for the Columbus Day 
observance is somewhat different than the version that 
survives today. It read, "I pledge allegiance to my Flag and to 
the Republic for which it stands-one Nation indivisible-with 
Liberty and Justice for all."22 At the 1923 National Flag 
Conference, the Pledge of Allegiance took to a national stage 
and began its metamorphosis out of Bellamy's hands and into 
mainstream American society. 23 The Conference leadership 
changed the phrase "my Flag" to "the Flag of the United States 
of America," over Bellamy's protests.24 The Pledge amendment 
sought to make it clear to immigrants that the flag being 
referenced was in fact the United States' Flag and not the flag 
of a state or any other nation.25 This amendment was adopted 
and the Pledge of Allegiance remained unchanged for thirty 
years-that is until the Knights of Columbus began a 
campaign to add "under God" to the text of the Pledge.26 
A. "Under God" 
The Knights of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal 
organization, did not think the Pledge fully encompassed the 
fabric of America without a mention of God.27 So, in 1952, the 
Supreme Council of the Knights of Columbus amended the 
Pledge for recitation at its meetings by adding the phrase 
"under God" after "one nation."2R The Knights of Columbus 
then petitioned the President of the United States, the Vice 
President of the United States, and the Speaker of the United 
States House of Representatives to similarly amend the 
Pledge.29 
In 1953, Representative Louis Rabaut of Michigan 
sponsored the first resolution in the United States Congress to 
amend the Pledge accordingly.30 Although they failed at first, 
22. !d. at 19. The salute to accompany thP PledgP consisted of raising one's arm 
toward the flag, but this salutP was rpplaced by placing one's hand over one's heart 
after the Bellamy salute became associated with Fascism and thl' Nazis during tlw 
Second World War. !d. at 20, 91. See 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 
2:3. ELLIS, supra note 15. at 58, 65. 
24. !d. at 65. 68. 
25. lei. at 65--116. 
2fi. !d. at 129-:lO. 
27. ld. at 130-:n 
28. lei. at 130. 
29. !d. 
:10. hi. at 131. 
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the Knights of Columbus and other fraternal organizations 
refused to give up and began to use Lincoln's Gettysburg 
address, which included the phrase "under God," as persuasive 
authority justifying the change.:n 
Reverend George MacPherson Docherty, a Presbyterian 
minister and pastor of the New York Avenue Presbyterian 
Church in Washington D.C., advocated adding "under God" to 
the Pledge, which was inspired by a phrase in Abraham 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, during his Sunday sermon to 
commemorate Lincoln's birthday.:l2 The following day, one of 
Docherty's petitiOners, Representative Charles Oakman, 
introduced a resolution to the House that would codify the 
inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge.:1:1 Two days later, 
Senator Homer Ferguson presented an identical resolution to 
the Senate.34 
The Oakman-Ferguson resolution, S.J.R. 126 in the Senate 
and H.J.R. 24:3 in the House, passed both chambers of 
Congress and President Eisenhower signed the bill into law on 
Flag Day, June 14, 1954.:1:1 Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower 
declared, "From this day forward, millions of our school 
children will daily proclaim ... the dedication of our nation and 
our people to the Almighty.":Hi Some opponents may argue that 
this statement by the President reveals the true intent of the 
amendment: to inculcate schoolchildren with religious tenets. 
Proponents may argue, however, that a statement by a sitting 
president cannot constitute legislative intent. 
B. The Codified Pled{{e 
In 1954, the decision of Congress and the President to add 
the phrase "under God" to the text of the Pledge of Allegiance 
brought the Pledge of Allegiance to the form we know today.:37 
The Pledge of Allegiance and its ceremonial recitation is now 
codified in 4 U.S.C. § 4: 
:n. Sec id. at 12•1. I :12. 
:l2. !d. at 132- :J:l. Coincidently. l'rcsich·nt EisenhowPr, who was in attendance at 
the· s<•rmon. was si1ting in the Lincoln pew at the time. Id. at J:l2. Evident!~·. h<• latc•r 
told Iloclwrt~· that he "agn·<·d with [th<; sl'rmonJ 'entirely.'" !d. at l:O:l. 
:n. !d. at l:n 
:1-1. !d. at l:l:\. 
:l:>. !d. at l:lfi-:l7. 
:Hi. Jd. at 1::37. 
:n. I U.S.C. ~ 1 (2000). 
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The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag: "I pledge allegiance to 
the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic 
for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all.," should be rendered by standing at 
attention facing the flag with the right hand over the heart. 
When not in uniform men should remove any non-religious 
headdress with their right hand and hold it at the left 
shoulder, the hand being over the heart. Persons in uniform 
should remain silent, face the flag, and render the military 
salute.:ls 
287 
Even before the Pledge's codification in the United States 
Code, school districts nationwide began to institute policies 
mandating the daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.39 
Unlike today, most of the Pledge policies of the day called for 
compulsory recitation of the Pledge and students declining to 
participate in the exercise for any reason were disciplined 
accordingly.40 It did not take long for such compulsory policies 
to make the Supreme Court's docket, however. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN COURT 
The twentieth century was a time of much development in 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. An issue of fierce 
debate that still continues today, 216 years after the 
ratification of the First Amendment, is what the Framers 
intended by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and 
how those clauses should be applied more than two centuries 
later. 
A. Early Challenges 
The first challenge to these compulsory Pledge policies 
reached the Supreme Court in 1940, fourteen years before the 
insertion of the phrase "under God," in the case of Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis. 41 In Minersville, the Court ruled that 
public school districts could compel students to participate in 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance,42 including students who saw 
the Pledge as a blasphemous idolatry in conflict with their 
:18. !d. 
39. EI.LI:-;. ;;upm notl' 1 G. at I :lti. 
40. ld. at 91-9~. 
41. :no U.S. Gs(i ( 1940). 
42. ld. at G~JH-GOO. 
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religious convictions, as the Gobitises did in Minersville. 4:3 The 
Minersville rule did not stand for long, however. The Court 
overruled its Minersville decision in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette. 44 The Court held that "compulsory 
unification of opinion" violated the First Amendment. 45 
B. The Path That Led to Elk Grove and Its Renewed Challenge 
Since the overt compulsion in Barnette is not equally 
present in today's Pledge policies, the Court has borrowed a lot 
of its modern Pledge of Allegiance jurisprudence from 
Establishment Clause principles found in more blatantly 
religion-based cases. In School District of Abington Township, 
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, the Supreme Court issued a ruling 
on two companion cases that both dealt with school policies 
requiring daily readings from the Bible.46 The Court held that 
this practice, as well as the practice of requiring a daily 
recitation of the Lord's Prayer, was unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.47 In their Schempp concurrence, 
however, Justices Goldberg and Harlan stated: 
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the 
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people 
believe in and worship God and that many of our legal, 
political and personal values derive historically from religious 
teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance of the 
existence of religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances 
the First Amendment may require that it do so. 4R 
In Lemon, the Court held that Rhode Island's Salary 
Supplement Act, which provided supplemental salary for 
teachers in nonpublic schools, and Pennsylvania's Nonpublic 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which reimbursed 
nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries, were unconstitutional 
because their impact predominantly benefited parochial 
schools. The Court deemed these practices "excessive 
entanglement between government and religion." 49 In its 
43. Id. at 591-92. 
44. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
45. Id. at 641. 
46. 374 U.S. 20:3, 205, 211, 226--27 (1963). 
47. Id. at 205-06, 226-27. 
48. Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 614 (1961). 
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Lemon opinion, the Court developed a test for determining 
whether statutes violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.50 The Court held that in order for a statute 
to pass constitutional muster, it must (1) have a secular 
purpose; (2) not have the primary effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion; and (3) not foster an excessive 
entanglement of government and religion. 51 
In the time between the Lemon and the Lee decisions, the 
Court has used three tests to measure constitutionality of 
school-based statutory programs and policies that are criticized 
for being too cozy with religion. First, the Court applied the 
Lemon test, which, as stated above, requires that the statute 
have a secular purpose, not have the primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion, and not foster excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.52 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court expounded upon the Lemon 
test while simultaneously declaring that it refused "to be 
confined to any single test or criterion."5:3 The Court held that 
"[i]n each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per 
se rule can be framed."54 It is in this "line-drawing process" 
that the Court acknowledged the utility of the Lemon test.55 
Nevertheless, the Court permitted a municipality's display of a 
nativity scene by focusing almost exclusively on the purpose 
prong, recognizing that even when religion substantially 
benefited, a secular purpose has saved such expressions from 
conflicting with the Establishment Clause.56 The Court 
demonstrated the truth of this principle by holding that 
"notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche," the 
city demonstrated a secular purpose that does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.G7 
In spite of the Court's dispositive use of the purpose prong 
to excuse the nativity display, Justice O'Connor would have 
modified the Lemon test in Lynch. She argued in her Lynch 
c,o. !d. at G 12 1 :L 
:11. !d. 
Ci2. !d. 
,):l. Hi''i U.S. fi(i8. 679 (1984) (holding that a nativit~; scene display by a 
municipal it:> die\ not violate tht> Establishnwnt Clause). 
i'i4. !d. at 678. 
fifi. !d. at (i7(J. 
fi6. !d. at (i80. The Court held that "[<>]ntanglenwnt is a question of kind and 
clegret> ... !d. at 684. 
i'i7. lrl. at 687. 
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concurrence that the government's "actual purpose" must be to 
endorse or denounce religion, while the effect prong mandates 
that the act "in fact convey[] a message of endorsement or 
disapproval," without consideration of the government's actual 
purpose.58 
In the Court's explanation of Lemon, it held that the focus 
of its inquiry must be in the proper context. ;)9 In Lynch, that 
meant that the Court had to analyze the nativity scene's 
constitutionality "in the context of the Christmas season."oO It 
follows, then, that under a Lynch rationale, the Court would 
have to analyze the Pledge within the context of educational 
instruction and curriculum. 
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 
the Court revised the Lemon test and developed a second test: 
the endorsement test.61 This test asked whether the 
government effectively endorses religion by passing and 
enforcing a statute. Government action fails the endorsement 
test by having either the purpose or the effect of favoring a 
particular religious belief or established religion. 62 
The third test used by the Court in its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence is the coercion test from Lee v. 
Weisman. 63 In Lee, a public school principal invited a rabbi to 
offer a prayer at the middle school's graduation ceremony.ol 
Weisman, a student, sought to prevent the prayer by way of a 
court order. 65 The motion was denied shortly before the 
ceremony that she attended.oo Weisman and her father 
subsequently brought an action and sued for a permanent 
injunction against Providence public schools from having clergy 
deliver prayers at future graduations, including her high school 
graduation.67 The district court granted relief to Weisman, 
i1H. Jd. at 690 (O'Connor. J .. concurring). 
i19. !d. at 679 (majority opinion). 
(iO. !d. 
Gl. 492 U.S. i17:l, fi92-94 (1989). Using this test. thP Court hPld that tlw displav 
of a cn~che violated the Establishment Clause, but that the display of a rrwnorah twxt 
to a Christmas tree did not have the unconstitutional effect of endorsing Christian and 
.Jewish faiths in an action against a municipality. !d. at G21. 
G2. !d. 
6:1. :10:) U.S. 577 (1992). 
64. !d. at 581. 
(ifi. !d. at 584. 
()(). !d. 
G7. !d. 
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through an application of the Lemon test, holding that the 
practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. fiH The First Circuit Court of Appeals, inflamed by 
a school district's open defiance of the court order by offering 
another prayer at a graduation, affirmed the district court's 
ruling in an opinion consisting of just ninety-five words from 
the circuit judge with absolutely no reasoning mentioned other 
than a statement that it agreed with the district court: ''We are 
in agreement with the sound and pellucid opinion of the 
district court and see no reason to elaborate further."69 
In a more pungent opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Court, likewise affirmed the permanent injunction against 
Providence. Rhode Island public schools. 70 The Court 
announced firmly that it would not reconsider its Lemon 
decision71 and held that clergy offering prayers as part of a 
public school graduation ceremony is barred by the 
Establishment Clause. 7'2 The Court did not apply the Lemon 
test to the facts of the case. Instead, the Court held that the 
prayer ceremony at the graduation failed to pass the new 
coercion test and thus did not pass constitutional muster.7:l 
On the issue of coercion, the Court held that "a high school 
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and 
benediction."/! The Court argued that since adolescents are 
susceptible to peer pressure, the "use [of] social pressure to 
enforce orthodoxy" violates the Establishment Clause.75 The 
Court in essence equated peer pressure with government 
compulsion to act. Holding that high school graduation is "one 
of life's most significant occasions," the Court suggested that 
students are not free to abstain from participating in the 
ceremony. 76 The coercion test, then, as deduced from the 
opinion in Lee, finds that government action violates the 
fl~. Weisman v. Lee, 72S F. Supp. 68, 7'2, 75 (D.R.L 1990). 
fi9. Weisman v. Lee, 90H F.2d 1090, 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). 
70. l"ce. 50i1 U.S. at 586. 
II. !d. at ;)Hi. 
12. ld. at i19~J. 
7:L Sec id. at !)99. 
71. Jd. at ;)9:\. 
/;). !d. at i19l. 
7fi. !d. at i19fi. 
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Establishment Clause if: (1) the action is directed by the 
government; (2) the act is a formal religious exercise; and (3) 
the direction by the government compels participation in the 
exercise from those present or in attendance. 77 
Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in Lee, which was 
joined by Justice Thomas, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
the late Justice White. 78 Justice Scalia explained that he could 
not join the opinion because it went against an opinion he 
joined in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
Union 79 coincidentally also written by ,Justice Kennedy.so In 
that opinion, Justice Kennedy urged that the Establishment 
Clause must be construed in light of the Nation's political and 
cultural heritage.Hl For this purpose, the Court declared that 
"[a] test for implementing the protections of the Establishment 
Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate 
longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the 
Clause."82 
Justice Scalia's Lee dissent further stated that since 
prayers at graduations have "long been recognized" and are 
"widely established,"83 Court precedent does not allow an 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that prohibits the 
practice. 84 This can equally be said of the Pledge of Allegiance. 
which has been recited in public classrooms since its inception 
in 1892. The dissent continued on to call the Lee majority's 
opmwn "incoherent," and classified its discussion of 
physiological coercion of adolescents as "[going] beyond the 
realm where judges know what they are doing."8i) ,Justice 
Scalia called the Court's notion that a student who respectfully 
sits during a prayer without participating "has somehow ... 
joined-in" as "nothing short of ludicrous."HG The dissent also 
77. See id. at 58G 117. 
78. Id. at G31 (Scalia .. J.. dissenting). 
79. Id.; see 492 U.S. i'i73. G5i'i (19119) (Kennedy .. J .. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
80. As with .Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lee, .Justice Kennedy's opinion 
in Allegheny was likewise joined by Chief .Justice Rehnquist and .Justic" Whill'. See 
Alle{fheny, 492 U.S. at 65i'i. 
81. Id. at 670. 
82. Id. 
8:1. Lee, 505 U.S. at 6:16 (Scalia,,) .. disol'nting). 
84. Id. at 631. 
85. Id. at 6:36. 
86. Id. at 637. 
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noted the majority's failure to apply the Lemon test and 
suggested that its ignoring Lemon altogether is a manifestation 
of its irrelevance.87 
In a particularly relevant comparison, the Lee dissent 
questioned how the Court could determine that psychological 
coercion existed during the prayer, but failed to disapprove of 
the students standing for the recitation of the Pledge of 
Allegiance immediately preceding the rabbi's prayer.ss In a 
foreshadowing of where some federal courts' Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence is today, Justice Scalia announced that 
the Pledge of Allegiance, as amended, would raise the same 
Establishment Clause issues as the prayers did in Lee.89 As 
Justice Scalia predicted, these Establishment Clause cases 
stemming out of school prayer, such as Lee, have become the 
crux of the Pledge of Allegiance analysis for some federal 
courts-especially in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 90 The 
dissent rhetorically asked if the Pledge must now be struck 
down in a sarcastic tone that indicated their view of such an 
assertion as nothing more than a ridiculous argument that 
could not be furthered on legal principles.9l The dissent 
recognized a slippery slope for references to ceremonial deism 
lest the Court's axe next fall on something as benign as the 
Pledge of Allegiance, which would "be the next project for the 
Court's bulldozer."92 
The dissent labeled the majority's definition of coercion as 
the "deeper flaw" of the Lee opinion.93 In its view, the adoption 
of "peer pressure" as sufficient coercion fails to meet "[t]he 
coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of 
religion."94 Traditionally, coercion was identified with a more 
repressive definition: "[B]y force of law and threat of penalty."95 
According to the dissent, coercion needed to be stronger than 
the unpleasantries of peer-pressure.96 Comparing the Lee facts 
87. ld. at 644. 
88. ld. at 638. 
89. ld. at 6:19. 
90. 8ee, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 606-07, 609 (9th Cir. 2002). 
91. Lee. 505 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
92. ld. 
9:1. ld. at 640. 
94. !d. 
9R. !d. Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as: "Compulsion by physical force 
or threat of physical force.'' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
96. 8ee Lee, f)():) U.S. at 640-41. 
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with those of Barnette, the dissent noted that the students in 
Barnette were faced with expulsion, institutional confinement. 
and prosecution of the students' parents.97 The dissent stated 
that it was thus an "extravagant claim" to assert that the state 
coerced the students in Lee. 9H 
In a closing statement equally applicable to the Pledge of 
Allegiance, Justice Scalia noted the voluntary nature of the 
exercises in Lee, much like the recitation of the Pledge: "To 
deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in 
order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal 
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful 
nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported 
in law."99 
Before Elh Grove v. Newdow, the Court last had an 
opportunity to consider the Pledge's constitutionality in 1993, 
but it denied certiorari.lOO In 1992, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a school district's 
policy of conducting a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of 
Allegiance, including the words "under God," was 
constitutional.lOl Thus, by the time Elh Grove reached the 
Supreme Court, it had been more than a decade since a federal 
appellate court had addressed the constitutionality of the 
Pledge of Allegiance. 
C. The Michael Newdow Crusade 
The Elk Grove Unified School District had a policy that 
required each of its elementary school classes to have a daily 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.102 Participation in the 
Pledge exercise was voluntary, based on the district's Pledge 
policy, and schools did not punish students for declining to 
pledge their allegiance to the f1ag.103 
Michael Newdow, an atheist minister. had a daughter who 
97. !d. at 642. 
9H. Id. 
99. Id. at 646. 
100. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21. 9HO F.2d l:l/ (7th Cir. 1 ~HJ:!). ccrt. 
denied. i10tl U.S. 9Ei0 (199:1). 
101. Id. at 44R. This case proved to be sufficiently persuasiw to thl" district murt 
judge who upheld the Pledge in Newdow's 2000 challeng<e. Newdow v. Cong., 201)() WL 
:J550fi91G, at *1 (E.D. Cal. :WOO). 
102. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. I, 7-R (2004). 
10:1. See id. 
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attended a school within the Elk Grove District boundaries.l04 
His daughter participated in the Pledge recitation at school-a 
practice that Newdow called a religious indoctrination of his 
child.l05 Newdow, representing himself in court, brought suit 
alleging that he had standing to do so on his own behalf and on 
behalf of his daughter as next friend.l06 Newdow claimed that 
the Pledge of Allegiance was inherently unconstitutional 
because of the words "under God" in the Pledge's text.l07 He 
also argued that the district's policy violated the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.lOH The magistrate judge who heard the case 
determined that the Pledge does not violate the Religion 
Clauses and is therefore constitutional.lO~J The District Court 
agreed with the magistrate judge and dismissed Newdow's 
complaint.llO Newdow appealed to the United States Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the 
lower court, issuing three separate opinions in the single 
appeal. Ill 
1. l'J ewdow I 
The first of the three Newdow decisions handed down by 
the Ninth Circuit came on June 26, 2002.112 The court held 
that Newdow had standingll:3 and reversed the decision of the 
trial court on the case's merits.ll4 In its opinion, the court 
applied the Lemon test to the Pledge of Allegiance and the Elk 
10•. Complaint at 14. Hl. New dow v. (\mg .. :2000 WL :l550ii91 () (E. D. Cal. :2000) 
(No. ClV. S-00-0495MLSPANPS). 
10fi. !d. at 20, 22. 
106. !d. at :1, 2G. Black's Law Dictionary defirw,.; a "next friend" as "[a[ person who 
appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who 
is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointPd as a guardian." BL\CI(S L-'.\\' 
DICTIO:--JAHY (Hth ed. 2004). 
107. Ser id. at :H. 
lOH. !d. at 24-25. 
109. Newdow v. Cong .. No. ClVS-00-0,19fiMLSI'ANPS. 2000 WL :3fifi059W. at *1 
(E.D. Cal. Julv 21. 2000). 
110. ld. 
111. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d fi97 (9th Cir. 2002): Nt'wdow v. U.S. Cong., 
:l13 F.:ld 500 (~Jth Cir. 2002): Newclow v. U.S. Cong .. :l28 F.:ld 46fi (9th Cir. :200:1). 
112. Neu•duw. 292 F.3d !>97. Newdow also joined Pn·siclent Clinton; the state of 
Califomia; Elk Grove Unified School District; David W. Gordon. Superintendent 
ECUSD: Sacramento City Unified Sl'hool Distril't: and .Jim Swt>c•ne\', Super·intPndent 
SCUSD to the action. ld. 
11 :;, !d. at fiOi>. 
11-1. ld. at fi12. 
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Grove policy, concluding that both inherently violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and are thus 
unconstitutional.ll5 
Judge Fernandez dissented, stating that "Congress has not 
compelled anyone to do anything"116 and arguing that the 
Religion Clauses "were not designed to drive religious 
expression out of public thought." 117 He also observed that the 
religious substance of the "under God" addition to the Pledge 
was so small that it is de minimis, or so minimal that the law 
does not take it into consideration. us 
2. Newdow II 
In response to Newdow I, Sandra Banning, the mother of 
Newdow's daughter, filed a motion to intervene.ll9 Although 
Banning and Newdow shared physical custody of their 
daughter, Banning had sole legal custody of the child, which 
included the exclusive right to represent the child's legal and 
educational interests.l20 She argued that her daughter did not 
have any objections to saying or hearing the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and that it was in the child's best interest not to be 
a party to the suit.l2l 
On December 4, 2002, the Ninth Circuit handed down its 
second opinion in the Newdow suit.122 After the court's initial 
June decision, the case received considerable national 
attention. For example, the United States Senate tried to 
intervene as a party after the June decision, but was deemed to 
lack standing to do so by the Ninth Circuit.123 
More importantly, however, the court denied Sandra 
Banning's motion to intervene or, in the alternative, to 
dismiss.124 The court held that the mother's sole legal custody 
did not deprive Newdow of Article III standing to bring the suit 
115. ld. at 611. (;!2. 
1Hi. Id. at 612 (Fernandez. J .. concurring and dissenting). 
117. Id. at 61::1. 
llH. Id. 
119. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
120. Id. 
121. Jd.at9-10. 
122. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 31:l F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2002). 
12>l. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 31 :l F.3d 495. 499 (9th Cir. 2002). 
124. Ne1t·dmc, :11:i F.3d i'iOO, 50i'i. 
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on behalf of his daughter in federal court. 125 On the merits of 
the case, the court held that when a school teacher leads 
students in reciting the Pledge, a message is sent that the state 
endorses "not just religion generally, but a monotheistic 
religion organized 'under God."' 126 
3. N ewdow III 
The Ninth Circuit handed down its third and final opinion 
on February 28, 2003.127 The court amended its earlier 
opinion, omitting the discussion of Newdow's standing to 
challenge 4 U.S.C. § 4, and then considered the defendants' 
motion for an en bane review. 12H While the court denied a 
motion for an en bane review, nine judges dissented at least in 
part to the denial for en bane review.129 
4. Man on a "mission" 
Besides his challenges to the phrase "under God" in the 
Pledge of Allegiance, Newdow has filed suits to strike the 
national motto, 130 enjoin the practice of praying at presidential 
inaugurations, 1:n and to eliminate the congressional 
125. ld. at 50G. In response to Banning's motion, Newdow filPd a motion for Rult• 
11 sanctions against her lawyer, which the court also denil•d. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. NPwdow v. U.S. Cong., :328 F.Jd 466 (9th Cir. 200:l). 
128. Id. at 46tHi9. 
129. Id. at 471-9:1. 
130. A challenge to "In God We Trust" was filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of California on November 18, 200G. The court dismissed the action on 
,June 12. 2006. Newdow v. Congress, 4:35 F.Supp.2d 1066 (E.D.Cal. 200fi). sub tWill. 
Newdow v. LeFevre, No. 06-16344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 
heard oral arguments in this appeal on the same day that it heard oral arguments in 
the Pledge of Allegiance case. 
1:n. On February 1. 2001, Newdow filed a lawsuit to enjoin the practice of praying 
at presidential inaugurations after two Christian clergymen offered prayers at GeorgP 
W. Bush's inauguration on January 20, 2001. The trial court ruled that this did not 
violate the Constitution and Newdow appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appt'ab 
held that Nt'wdow did not have standing to bring the suit. See also Mike N<ewdow"s 
Past Litigation Page, http://www.restorethepledge.com/live/past_litigation (last visited 
Mar. 30. 2008) [hereinafter Liti!{ation]; see Newdow v. Bush. 2004 WL 3344:JH (9th Cir. 
2004). Then, on December 17, 2004, Newdow filed another lawsuit to enjoin President 
Bush's Presidential Inaugural Committee from having chaplains provide prayers at 
Bush's second inauguration. l~itigation, supra; see Newdow v. Bush. :lG5 F.Supp.2d 2fiG 
(D.D.C. 200R). A motion for a preliminary injunction was denied on Januar~' 14, 200il. 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed that denial on ,January Hi. Litigation. supm; 
Newdow. :JGFi F. Supp. 2d 2fiG; Newdow v. Bush, 200G WL 89011 (D.C. Cir. 200G). 
According to Michael Newdow's Weh site, the United States Supreme Court denit>d 
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chaplain.1:32 He is currently shopping for the '"proper' plaintiff' 
to bring suit on these issues again.133 
D. Elk Grove v. Newdow 
The United States Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari 
to Elk Grove Unified School District on October 14, 20031:'34 
and heard oral arguments on March 24, 2004.1:35 The Court 
issued its decision on June 14, 2004, in an opinion written by 
Justice Stevens.136 The Court held that because California law 
deprives Newdow of the right to sue as next friend, he did not 
have Article III standing to challenge the school district's 
Pledge of Allegiance policy in federal court.t:l7 To have 
standing in federal court, Newdow must have demonstrated 
that (1) the Pledge of Allegiance policy caused him actual 
injury and (2) that his interests he sought to be protected were 
meant to be regulated by the constitutional guarantee in 
question. 
N ewdow failed the first prong of the standing requirement 
because he did not suffer an actual injury and was ineligible to 
represent his daughter as next friend. 1 :Js Since N ewdow did not 
have custody of his daughter, he could not bring a lawsuit on 
her behalf without her mother's permission.J:l9 Since Newdow 
lacked standing to bring the suit in federal court, the question 
of whether the Pledge of Allegiance violates the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment was a moot point. 
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and 
former Justice O'Connor issued separate opinions in which 
they addressed the constitutional question raised by the case. 
certiorari on Jnnuar:-.· 19. mw da\· prior to Bush's 200il inauguration. Following the 
inauguration, final judgment was rendered on Newdow's suit by a federal district 
court. He was ch,nied relief on the basis that he lacked standing to bring the suit and 
that the point at issue was moot. See Litigation, supra. 
1:32. Newdow filed a lawsuit to discontinue the use of congressional chaplains in 
August. 2002. but the District Court for the District of Columbia held that Newdow 
lacked standing to bring tlw suit. See Utigotion, supra note l:ll; sec also Newdow v. 
Eagc•n, :w9 F.Supp.2d 29 (D. D.C. 2004). 
1 :J:l. Sec Litigation. supra note 1:-ll (sc•eking a '"proper' plaintiff' to challenge the 
use of congressional chaplains). 
l:l-±. Elk Grovc• Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (200:3). 
J:lG. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ncwdow. 542 U.S. I (2004). 
l:Hi. Jd. 
1:n. ld. at 17 lS. 
J:lS. Id. 
1:39. Jd. 
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In what were labeled as concurring opinions, the three justices 
dissented to the Court's conclusion that Newdow lacked 
prudential standing to bring the suit on behalf of his daughter, 
but concurred in the judgment of the Court based on the merits 
of the case through an analysis of the constitutional 
question.140 
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence 
With his semi-accusatory opening, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
called the Court's reasoning for dismissal "a novel prudential 
standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the 
constitutional c1aim."l41 The Chief Justice stated that he 
dissented from the opinion that Newdow lacked standing to 
sue, but concurred in the judgment based on the merits of the 
constitutional claim. 142 He stated that the school district's 
Pledge policy, which "require[d] teachers to lead willing 
students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes 
the words 'under God,' does not violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment." 14:1 
The Chief Justice took a more historical approach than the 
other concurring justices, stressing that the Pledge and its 
"under God" language represents a well-established patriotic 
exercise with roots in the nation's founding, not a religious 
exercise analogous to the prayer in Lee. 14+ He cited historical 
authority consisting of examples of "patriotic invocations of 
God and official acknowledgements of religion's role in our 
Nation's history." 145 Some of the examples given by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist included George Washington's first 
inauguration, Washington's "day of public thanksgiving and 
prayer" proclamation, Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address 
and second inaugural address, Woodrow Wilson's request to 
Congress for a declaration of war against Germany in World 
War I, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first inaugural address, and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower's admonition to soldiers during World 
140. !d. at 1H (I{Phnquist. C .. J .. concurring): id. at :o:l (O'Connor .. J.. concmring): id. 
at 45 (Thomas, J .. concurring). 
141. Jd. at 18 (Rehnquist, C. ,J., concurring). 
142. Jd. 
143. Jd. 
144. !d. at 26. :11. 
145. Jd. at 26. 
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War II.l46 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also recognized the long tradition 
of this acknowledgement by pointing to many common civic 
declarations that have a similar reference to God. These 
included the national motto, "In God We Trust;"l47 a phrase in 
the national anthem, "In God is our trust;"148 and the opening 
proclamation by the Marshal of the Supreme Court, "God save 
the United States and this honorable Court."149 
"The phrase 'under God' [in the Pledge] is in no sense a 
prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion," the Chief Justice 
recognized. 150 As such, he argued that the facts in the Elk 
Grove case are sufficiently different from Lee as to make Lee 
inapplicable because the Pledge is neither an explicit religious 
exercise nor a formal religious exercise.151 The Pledge, he 
stated, is a patriotic observance and an oath to the Nation and 
"not to any particular God, faith, or church."152 Additionally, 
he noted that students may abstain from pledging their 
allegiance and are thus not coerced to do so by the 
government.lG3 To allow Michael Newdow or any other person 
to use a "heckler's veto" against such a voluntary patriotic 
exercise is, the Chief Justice reasoned, "an unwarranted 
extension of the Establishment Clause." 154 
2. Justice O'Connor's concurrence 
Justice O'Connor likewise concluded that the school 
district's Pledge of Allegiance policy "does not offend the 
Establishment Clause." 155 Her opinion focused less on the 
historical argument and more on a principle-based argument in 
favor of the Pledge's constitutionality.156 
Her main premise was that the Establishment Clause 
14fi. Id. at 26--29. 
14 7. :l6 U.S. C. ~ :301 (2000). 
141-l. FIL\:\CIS SCOTT KEY, The Star-Spanf{led Banner (1814). Line six of the f"ourth 
verse of the Star-Spangled Banner includes the phrase, "In God is our Trust." ld. See 
also :ofi U.S.C. § :w2 (2000). 
149. mk Graue, fi42 U.S. at 29-30. 
150. ld. at :31. 
1 iil. ld. 
lfi2. Jd. 
lfi:l. !d. at :11 n.1. 
1 fi4. ld. at :o:l. 
1 ;;;;_ !d. at :3;3 (O'Connor .• J., concurring). 
] 56. !d. 
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cannot be reduced to a single test, but that the '"different 
categories of Establishment Clause cases [ ... ] may call for 
different approaches."'l57 Justice O'Connor suggested that a 
revised endorsement test is the most appropriate test to apply 
in cases such as Elk Grove that deal with a concept of 
ceremonial deism contained within the text of the Pledge of 
Allegiance and other civic observances.l58 
Justice O'Connor explained that there are two principles 
that must be examined by a court when applying the 
endorsement test. First, the objective viewpoint of a 
"reasonable observer" must be considered since a subjective 
approach to the endorsement analysis would "reduce the test to 
an absurdity," yielding unpredictable and arbitrary results.159 
Second, the exercise must be viewed in its proper context and 
origins so that the reasonable observer would know the history 
and place of the conduct before applying the test so that the 
analysis could truly be objective.160 
Applying this approach to the endorsement test, Justice 
O'Connor concluded that "[t]he reasonable observer ... fully 
aware of our national history and the origins of such practices, 
would not perceive [the Pledge] as signifying a government 
endorsement of [religion]." 161 She labeled such references to 
God as mere references to ceremonial deism.162 
According to Justice O'Connor, references to ceremonial 
deism do not offend the Constitution when examined in light of 
their context, character, and history.163 She concluded that the 
reference to God in the Pledge is an example of ceremonial 
deism, as are the references in the national motto and the 
national anthem.164 To determine whether "God" is a reference 
to a religious belief or merely to ceremonial deism, Justice 
O'Connor proposed a four-part test: (1) the reference is 
historical; (2) it is not overly prayerful; (3) it is nonsectarian; 
157. ld. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, .J., 
concurring)). 
15/l. ld. at 33-34. 
159. ld. at 34-35. 
160. !d. 
1Gl. !d. at 3G. 
1G2. !d. at 37. Before O'Connor's Elh Graue concurrence, ,Justice Brennan 
recognized the ceremonial deism argument in his Lynch u. Donnelly dissent. 4f)fi U.S. 
668, 71G (Brennan, .J., dissenting). 
1G:L Rlh Graue, 542 U.S. at 37 (O'Connor, J .. concurring). 
164. ld. 
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and (4) it contains only minimal religious content.l65 Through 
adherence to this formula, Justice O'Connor suggests that a 
practice that passes muster could not be perceived to endorse 
religion by the reasonable observer.166 
Applying this test to the case, she concluded that the Pledge 
of Allegiance merely contains a reference to ceremonial 
deism. 167 As such, the phrase "under God" in the Pledge is 
constitutional; it is allowed under the Establishment Clause 
because it is not incorporated into any religion's canon, it is not 
administered by members of the clergy in public schools, it does 
not meet the Court's definition of prayer, it is a historical 
reference to the United States as a Nation, and because the 
reference is an inconsequential two words.16H She further 
noted that the brevity of the phrase supports the notion that it 
is not meant to endorse religion and that it allows for easy 
opting out by students who do not wish to utter the phrase 
"under God." 1 (1~ 
Justice O'Connor also pointed out that although the Pledge 
has been recited in schools for fifty years since the addition of 
the "under God" phrase, Elk Grove was only the third challenge 
to its constitutionality in federal court. 170 She discounted the 
explanation that a timid citizen-base was unwilling to 
challenge the Pledge on Establishment Clause grounds.l71 She 
pointed out that, in the interim, Establishment Clause-
grounded challenges have been made on a broad range of 
practices: reading stories about witches and Halloween in 
school, using The Learning Tree in literature classes, providing 
an explanation of the theory of evolution in a museum, and 
using an Aztec sculpture in a Mexican culture commemoration, 
among others. 172 
In summary, Justice O'Connor argued that the Pledge's 
reference to God is a reference to ceremonial deism, which is an 
"inevitable consequence of the religious history that gave birth 
Hiii. /d. at :n-,14. 
1fi(i. See id. at :Hi-:38. 
Hi7. Jd. at :37. 
lfiH. ld. at 40--4:). 
1fi~. !d. at 4:\. 
170. ld. at :)H-:l~l. 
1 1"1. ld. at :39. 
172. !d. at :w. 
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to our founding principles of liberty." 173 Nothing less should be 
expected in the founding of the Nation by "religious refugees" 
and references to ceremonial deism in patriotic exercises must 
be examined in that context.l74 
3. Justice Thomas's concurrence 
Justice Thomas unequivocally stated his purpose for 
writing his concurrence: "We granted certiorari in this case to 
decide whether the ... Pledge policy violates the Constitution. 
The answer to that question is: 'no."'17fi Justice Thomas 
immediately attacked the Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, which he described as being in "hopeless 
disarray." 17fi He specifically attacked the Lee decision, stating 
that "Lee adopted an expansive definition of 'coercion' that 
cannot be defended." 177 He noted, however, that the problem 
goes beyond Lee>. 17H 
Justice Thomas admitted that "[i]t is difficult to see how 
[the Pledge] does not entail an affirmation that God exists."l79 
Thus, if the Court followed Lee and other Court precedents on 
point, it would he required to strike down the Pledge of 
Allegiance as unconstitutional.lSO With the correction of Lee 
and other Establishment Clause jurisprudence, however, 
Justice Thomas would uphold the Pledge policy because he 
believes that it is not subject to the Establishment Clause in 
the first place.lHl The main premise of Justice Thomas's 
concurrence is that the Establishment Clause is a federalism 
provision that cannot be incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and is thus moot in the determination of whether 
the Pledge policy of the Elk Grove School District violates the 
Establishment Clause.1S2 In fact, Justice Thomas asserted that 
17:1. !d. at 44. 
17 4. fcl. at :l:'i :l7. 
17:). Id. at 'lfi (Thomas, ,J., concurring). 
176. !d. (quoting ]{osPnhL•rger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va .. !)15 U.S. 819, 
Stil (J>J}.li'i) (Thomas .. 1 .. concurring)). 
1/1. Jcl. at 4i'i. 
1/8. lcl. 
119. ld. at ·IS. 
JSO. lei. at 4ti. l~l. 
181. Tel. at 4ti. 
1 S:2. I d. at 4i'i· 'lfi. In constitutional law, incorporation opnotl's a special meaning. 
Incorporation is tlw mPans of applying provisions from the Bill of Rights to the states 
hy way of interprding thl' Four·1.PPnth Amendment's Due Process Clause to encompass 
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by incorporating the Establishment Clause and applying it to 
the states, the government would be violating the very thing 
that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect: freedom 
from congressional interference with state establishments of 
religion.18:3 
Looking at the text of the Establishment Clause, Justice 
Thomas stated that the Establishment Clause prevents 
Congress from establishing a national religion and from 
interfering with the state establishment of religion.184 He 
asserted that nothing in the language of the Constitution 
suggests that the Clause extends any further than that or that 
it protects any individual rights from being abridged through 
state action due to incorporation.185 
Justice Thomas argued that, unlike the Free Exercise 
Clause, which protects an individual right, the Establishment 
Clause does not protect an individual right, but is merely a 
federalism provision to protect the states from the imposition of 
the federal government and thus necessarily resists 
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.18fi Thus, he 
concluded that the Pledge of Allegiance is constitutional 
because it does not violate any free exerc1se rights of 
individuals.187 
those rights. Since its ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment has bcocon used by the 
Court to incorporate provisions from the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendments. 
Total incorporation of the Bill of Rights is rarely advocated since the incorporation of 
certain provisions, such as those contained in the Tenth Amendment, would seem 
counterproductive to incorporate. More commonly, the Court has taken a ''selective 
incorporation" approach by which only Clertain provisions of the Bill of Rights are 
applied to thco states through the Fourteenth Anwndmpnfs Due l'rocpss Clause. See, 
e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, :378 U.S. 478 (1964) (incorporating Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of right to counsel): Mapp v. Ohio. :167 U.S. 64:1 (1961) (incorporating Fourth 
Amendment protection against. unreasonable searches and seizures). 
18:1. Id. 
184. Id. at 50. 
185. I d. T n contrast, the most notable argument in favor of the incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause comes from .Justice Brennan's concurTenc<· in Schempp . • ]u;;ticP 
Brennan argued that an appmach similar to .Justice Thomas's "underestimates the rolt• 
of the Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of 
religious liberty." Sch. Dist. v. Schempp. :174 U.S. 2(J:l, 2flfi (196:1) (Brennan. ,J., 
concurring). His main premise was that the "Framers did not L'ntrust the liberty of 
religious beliefs to either clause alone," but that the two l{digion ClausL'S best protect 
individual religious rights when applied in harmony with l'ach other. Id. lie continues 
that "religious Iibert,· ... would not be viable if tlw Constitution were interprcoted to 
forbid only establishments ordained by Congress." !d. at 2P>K 
lHfi. Elh (;roue. i)42 U.S. at 49 (Thomas. ,J.. concurring). 
187. Id. 
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Justice Thomas also argued that Lee failed to correctly 
address the Establishment Clause, but merely perverted the 
definition of coercion.l ss He stated that coercion, in terms of 
the Establishment Clause, necessarily calls for actual legal 
coercion "'by force of law and threat of penalty."' 189 He agreed 
that the Establishment Clause bars governmental preferences 
for particular religious faiths, but reiterates that "[l]egal 
compulsion is an inherent component of 'preferences' in this 
context."190 
In essence, Justice Thomas believed the Pledge of 
Allegiance does not offend the Constitution because 1) it did 
not violate the Free Exercise Clause; and 2) the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not incorporate the Establishment Clause and 
therefore did not apply. Furthermore, he believed that even if 
the Establishment Clause did apply, the Pledge of Allegiance is 
still constitutional because 1) the definition of coercion stated 
by the Court in Lee was incorrect and 2) the Pledge does not 
constitute coercion in his own coercion test. 191 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
On November 4, 2002, Congress passed S. 2690, which the 
President signed on November 13, 2002, reaffirming the 
language of the Pledge of Allegiance with the "under God" 
phrase included: "In codifying this subsection, ... the 107th 
Congress reaffirmed the exact language that has appeared in 
the Pledge for decades." 192 
A. Congressional Motive 
Not afraid to be transparent as to its motivation for the 
resolution, Congress declared that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals' holding and rationale in Newdow was "erroneous."19:1 
lHH. !d. 
lilY. /d. (quoting Le<• v. Weisman, fi()fi U.S. Fi77. ti40 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
180. !d. at ii3. 
191. /d. at 4:1.61-62. ii·1. 
192. 1 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. 2002) (S. 2690. ~ 1 is comprised of "Findings." S. 2690 §2 is 
the actual 1·eaffirmation of thP Pledge. Thf~ bill has since be<'n passed as Public Law 
107-29:1 and codified in 4 U .S.C. §4. Thus, while these findings probably represent 
what would be labeled "legislative history," they are publishled in the actual code 
section and are not mPn~ly found in supplempntal sources of legislative history). 
19:1 !d. 
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Congress criticized the Ninth Circuit's rationale by pointing 
out that by adhering to its reasoning, "absurd result[s]" would 
follow. 194 For example, even "teacher-led voluntary recitations 
of the Constitution itself would be unconstitutional," since the 
Constitution contains an "express religious reference'' by use of 
the phrase "Year of our Lord" in Article VII. 19Fi 
B. Congressional Justification 
In the 2002 amendment to 4 U.S.C. §4, which re-codified 
the Pledge of Allegiance, Congress added authority to its intent 
by adding a section entitled "Findings" in support of the 
Pledge's use of the phrase "under God."l96 Traveling across an 
American heritage timeline of sorts, Congress expressed to the 
courts and to the American public its resolve to secure the 
Pledge of Allegiance in its present form. 
Congress began by describing the Mayflower Compact, 
which declared, "Having undertaken, for the Glory of God and 
the advancement of the Christian Faith and honor of our King 
and country, a voyage to plant the first colony in the northern 
parts of Virginia." 197 
Congress next appealed to the founding of the Nation by 
quoting the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these 
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 
Happiness."198 Then, through a nostalgic look at notable 
Founders, Congress related quotes by Thomas Jefferson. "God 
who gave us life gave us liberty,"l99 and George Washington, 
"Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can 
repair; the event is in the hand of God!"200 
In a clear jab at the Court's rocky Establishment 
jurisprudence, Congress added another tidbit of American 
history trivia: 
On ,July 21, 1789, on the same day that it approved the 
194. ld. 
19:). !d. 
l9li. !d. 
197. !d. (quoting TilE MAYFLOWER COMI'i\CT (1620)). 
198. !d. (quoting Till<: lh:CLi\RATION OF lNilEPE;\IDENC:E, para. 1 (U.S. 1 77(i)). 
1 ~19. !d. (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, N()'f'I<;S ON THE S'l'i\TE OF VIJU;JNIA ( 17H I)). 
200. ld. (quoting G<,m·gp Washington, !'resident of the Constitutional Conwnl ion. 
Befon• the Constitutional Convention Delegates (May 14, 17H7)). 
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Establishment Clause concerning religion, the First Congress 
of the United States also passed the Northwest Ordinance, 
providing for a territorial government for lands northwest of 
the Ohio Hiver, which declared: "Heligion, morality, and 
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education 
shall forever lw encouraged."201 
Congress then appealed to the same authority that 
Reverend Docherty did in his sermon: George Washington's 
proclamation for "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer," and 
Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which included the 
phrase "under God."202 Again showing the American public 
that this amendment was a direct congressional response to 
the federal courts' current Pledge jurisprudence, Congress cited 
Supreme Court case law as further justification for its 
measure.20:1 Citing the 1952 Zorach v. Clauson decision, 
Congress quoted Justice William Douglas who wrote for the 
Court: 
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every 
and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and 
State. !={ather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific 
ways, in which there shall be no concern or union or 
dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the 
matter. Othl~rwise the State and religion would be aliens to 
each other~hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly .... A 
fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the 
supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court."204 
Congress lastly reminded the courts and the American 
people of its own precedent by noting the 1954 amendment to 
the Pledge passed by Congress and signed by President 
Eisenhower, the 1956 congressional proclamation of the 
national motto of the United States as "In God We Trust," and 
other examples of "reference to our religious heritage" as noted 
by former Chief Justice Burger.205 
:201. lei. (quoting NoH'I'HWJ·:ST ORDINANCE, art. Ill (U.S. 17H7)). 
:20:2. lei. ('"[TJhat this Nation. under God, shall have a 1ww birth of freedom -- and 
that Gm·ernnwnt of the people, by the people, for the people. shall not perish from the 
earth ... (quoting Abraham Lincoln. Gettysburg Address (Nov. Hl. J 86c3) (emphasis 
added)). 
:203. lei. 
204. lei. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, :343 U.S. :306, :312-l:l (1%2)). 
20:0. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (l!'JH4)). 
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Congress's findings added authority to the Pledge's existing 
wording and signaled Congress's intent to maintain it, even in 
the face of Elk Grove v. Newdow. 
V. POST-ELK GROVE LITIGATION 
Although the Supreme Court handed down its opmwn in 
Elk Grove v. Newdow just four years ago, much has happened 
with respect to the Pledge of Allegiance and its struggle for 
survival in today's public schools. By the looks of it, the final 
determinative ruling on the Pledge of Allegiance is just on the 
horizon. 
A. N ewdow v. Congress 
Undeterred by the Supreme Court's 2004 decision, Michael 
Newdow initiated yet another challenge to the Pledge in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on 
January 3, 2005.206 This time around, Newdow filed suit as a 
co-plaintiff with two other sets of parents and their minor 
children, whom he represented as counsel.207 While Newdow 
still lacked standing, the court held that the other parents had 
standing to challenge the school district policy.20K The district 
court, which issued its decision on September 14, 2007, held 
that Newdow III was binding precedent and enjoined the school 
district from enforcing its Pledge policy, but stayed the ruling 
pending its appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.209 
The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case on 
Tuesday, December 4, 2007.210 
206. Complaint. Newdow v. Cong .. :3H:l F. Supp.2d 1229 (E.D. C'al. 200i'i) (No. Civ. 
S-05-17LKK/DAD). 
207. Newdow, :383 F. Supp.2d at 12:ll-:32. The additional plaintiffs are ilb1tified 
as Jan Doe, Pat Doe. and Jan Roe (parents). and Doe Child. Roechild-1. and Ropchild-2 
(minor children). fcl. at 1231 n.l. 
208. !d. at 12:17. 
209. Newdow v. Cong., No. Civ.SOfil7LKKDAD, 200G WL :JJ440tlf;, at *1 *2 (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 18, 2005). 
210. Audio of Oral Arguments. Newdow v. Rio Linda. No. OG-17257 (9th Cir. 
argued Dec. 4, 2007), auailable at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/media.nsf/ 
24E980CBAF33C47A882573A 70079617:ll$file/05-172:>7. wma. The Ninth Circuit's 
three-judge panel that heard Newdow's latest Pledge challenge consisted of ,Judges 
Steven Reinhardt, Dorothy Nelson, and Carlos Bea. ld. While Nelson and Bea are new 
to the Pledge debate. Reinhardt was part of the 2-1 majority that d<·clared the Pledge 
unconstitutional. If oral arguments are indicative, Reinhardt is still unwavering in his 
position. For example, when. in response to ,Judge Bea's question. Reinhardt suggested 
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If precedent is any indication, it is likely that the Ninth 
Circuit will affirm the district court's order. Whatever the 
Ninth Circuit's decision, however, it is likely that an appeal 
will be taken by the losing party. If that is the case, the 
Supreme Court could hear the case as early as late 2008 and 
could render a decision on the issue sometime in early-to-mid 
2009. Although this timetable is merely speculative, it 
represents the immediacy of the Court's likely need to address 
this issue on its merits. With such a potential landmark case 
on the near horizon, a justice-specific speculation on the 
Court's leaning based on previous jurisprudence becomes 
particularly pertinent. In addition, however, the political 
pressures facing the justices is a factor that cannot be brushed 
aside and ignored based on an ideological hope of indifference. 
to Newdow that an inherent stigma is sufficient injury for a student who leaves the 
classroom during the Pledge, Bea jokingly labeled the timdy assistance as "a lifeline." 
.Judge 13ea. on tlw otlwr hand, n'minded Newdow that of the Supreme Court justices 
who have discussed the constitutionality of "under God" in the Pledge, all fourteen 
have sided with the Pk•clge (noting that in Alle,l{heny. the Court even used the Pledge 
as a permissibl<' constitutional benchmark). Notwithstanding, Nelson asked if 
removing "God" from the pJr,clge would make it any less patriotic. !d. 
The appellants split their time between thrc•e parties, but the government 
began by mwquivocally declaring. "Thr• voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance 
in pub I ic schools does not violate the Establishment Clause." Ther·eafter. the appPllants 
essentially argtJPd (l) the district court erred by relying on the vacated Newdow Ill 
decision, (2) the Pledge is not "akin" to the prayer in Lee, (:i) the Pledge is a legitimate 
element of the school curriculum that teaches tolerance for those who choose not to 
participate, and ( 4) thr' refenmce to God is not a religious affirmation. but a reference 
to the "philosoplwr's Gocl" or ceremonial deism, which is a Brennan and O'Connor-like 
idea of ceremonial deism. ld. 
Michael 1\'ewdow contended that the Pledge has religious significance, 
characterizing the case as not being between believers and nonbelievers. but instead 
between one group that belir,ves in treating people equally and one group that believes 
in treating peoplr' unequally. He plead to the court. "I hope this Court will go for 
equalitv.'' In the context. of this Comment, an exchange between Newdow and the panel 
regarding the Supreme' Court's likely disposition is particularly ironic. The panel 
advisc·cl Newclow, "If I were you, 1 wouldn't try to count up the votes.'' Notwithstanding, 
Newdow contendr,d, "I think there's definitely four votes there and I'm not sure there 
aren't many mon,. WP haven't heard from a couple of the justices.'' The four votes 
Newclow is likely refprring to are tbose of Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and 
Ginsburg. !d. 
Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's released opinion, it is likely that both sides 
would appeal an unfavorable decision. That being said, ,Judge Reinhardt's light-hearted 
remark in Newdow's other oral argument on the same clay and before the same court 
(the national motto case) has a ring of truth to it: "] think if we agreed with Mr. 
Newclow, you'd have a good chance [of finding out what the Supreme Court would do in 
this case]. If we agree with [the government], the Supreme Court might not take it." 
Audio of Oral Arguments, Newclow v. LeFevre, No. 06-16344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4, 
2007): see supra note l:lO. 
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B. Congressional Reaction-Again 
Congress has never been shy about its endorsement of the 
Pledge of Allegiance. For example, as mentioned in Section IV, 
in an express response to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in Newdow v. Congress, the United States House of 
Representatives considered Senate bill S. 2690 titled, An Act to 
Reaffirm the Reference to One Nation Under God in Pledge of 
Allegiance.21l The bill passed the House by an overwhelming 
margin of 401-5 and unanimously passed the Senate 99-0.2U 
With the passage of this bill, Congress announced 
unequivocally that a reverence for the Pledge of Allegiance, as 
presently constituted, still exists in the United States. 
It should come of little surprise then that on May 17, 2005, 
just four months after Newdow filed his latest Pledge lawsuit. 
House Bill 2389 was introduced in the House of 
Representatives.21:3 H.R. 2389 would amend title 28 of the 
United States Code to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts 
to hear certain cases and controversies involving the Pledge of 
Allegiance.214 The bill's sponsor, Representative W. Todd Akin, 
a Republic Congressman from Missouri, presented the bill with 
its 197 co-sponsors as the Pledge Protection Act.2lil 
The jurisdictional limitation would not apply to the 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals, however.2Hi The hill, as voted on 
by the House of Representatives, included the following 
addition: "This Act and the amendments made by this Act take 
211. An Act to ]{paffirm the Reference to One Nation Under (;ud in Pledge of 
Allegiance, S. 2690, 107th Cong. (2002): see ·1 U.S.C. ~4 (Supp. 2002) (citHl 
reaffirmation in anwndnwnt by Pub. L. No. 107-29:1, (Nov. 1 :;, 2002)). 
212. GovTrack.us, S. 2690 [107th]: l'ledgP of Allegiance Bill, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl07-2690 (last visil.l•d Mar. 24, 2008). 
213. GovTrack.us, II.R. 2::389 [109th]: Pledge l'rol.l•ction Act of 2006, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2:l89 (last. visit.t•d Mar. 24, 2008). 
214. Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109t.b Cong. ~ 2 (200fi). The hill was 
passed by the House on .July 19, 2006, but stalled in the S,·nat.e Committl'e on the 
,Judiciary. GovTrack.us. supra note 213. The bill would hav<• am<'IHI<·d chapter 99 of 
title 28 of the United Statl's Code by adding Section 1fi:l2 which n·ads in part a-; 
follows: ""(a) Except as provided in subsection (b). no court creat<•d bv :\ct of Congn•s-; 
shall have an:.· jurisdiction. and the Supreme Court shall haw· no appellatP 
jurisdiction, to !war or decide any question pertaining to tlw int<•rpn'tation of. or the 
validity under thL· Constitution of. the Pledge of Allegiam·l'. as dl·fim·d in spction -1 of" 
title 4, or its recitation." H.K 2:lH9. 
215. GovTrack.us. supra note 218. 
216. H.R. 2:l89. 
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effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply to any 
case that (l) is pending on such date of enactment; or (2) is 
commenced on or after such date of enactment.''217 H.R. 2389 
passed the House of Representatives on July 19, 2006, by a 
vote of 260-167-a passage rate of more than sixty percent.21H 
The bill was received by the Senate on August 4, 2006 and was 
referred to the Senate Committee on the ,Judiciary.2HJ 
Although the bill died when the 110th Congress convened. 
Representative W. Todd Akin re-introduced it as H.R. 699 in 
2007.220 Congress has not taken any further action on this bilL 
however.221 If Congress passes such a bill and it is signed into 
law, it could squelch any future challenges to the Pledge. 
Given the sharp partisan divide on the topic,222 it is 
unlikely that a Democrat-controlled Congress will pass the 
Pledge Protection Act. Therefore, this battle will likely play 
itself out in the proper forum-the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Since the Court will likely have to settle the 
Pledge's constitutionality at some point, it is important to 
examine how the sitting justices would likely vote. With the 
departure of two longtime justices since the Elh Grove decision 
(the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and the retired Justice 
O'Connor), such an analysis becomes particularly paramount 
for the Court's newcomers. 
VI. THE COURT'S CURRENT DISPOSITION 
To most accurately hypothesize how the current Court 
would rule when the issue of the Pledge of Allegiance again 
presents itself, an examination into prior opinions written by 
the sitting justices provides the most predictable and 
trustworthy results. For most of the justices, a glance through 
the Supreme Court Reporter leaves a predictive record of how a 
particular justice would rule. But for the new justices, Justice 
Alita and Chief Justice Roberts, a more expansive view is 
217. /d. 
21 H. GovTrack.us. supra note :n:J. 
21 fl. !d. 
220. (;ovTrack.us. H.K 69fl: Pledge Prott•ction Act of 2007. 
http://www.govtrack.us/congrl'ss/bill.xpd?bill=h 11 0-()99 (last visited Mar. 24. 2008). 
221. lei. 
222. For PxamplP. ninety-six pm-cPnt of llousl' Republicans supported H. it 2:lH9. 
whilt• eighty-o1w perct•nt of Democrats opposed it. /d. 
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necessary to predict their disposition on the Pledge of 
Allegiance. 
A. Elk Grove Insights and Justice Thomas 
As discussed above, the various Elk Grove opinions shed 
considerable light on the disposition of the Court members. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, issued a determinative 
"no" to the question of whether the Pledge violates the 
Constitution in his concurring opinion.223 While Justice 
Thomas might not join an opinion deeming the Pledge 
constitutionally-sound under current Court jurisprudence, he 
would likely concur in such a judgment and issue a separate 
opinion outlining an argument similar to his Elk Grove 
incorporation argument, discussed in III.D.3., supra. He might 
even call for overruling decisions such as Lee and Lemon. 
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered an 
opinion similar to Justice Thomas's, declaring that the Pledge 
of Allegiance is not a violation of the Establishment Clause.224 
Whether his replacement, Chief Justice John Roberts, would 
rule likewise is an issue taken up below. 
B. Chief Justice Roberts 
The new Chief Justice is likely to follow his predecessor, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. It was not surprising that the new 
Chief Justice declined to state specifically how he would rule on 
a Pledge of Allegiance case during his Senate confirmation 
hearing,225 but he did venture out further than he did on other 
possible issues to come before the Court. Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that the Court has not been entirely consistent 
in its interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: "That is an area in which I think the Court can 
redouble its efforts to try to come to some consistency in its 
approach."22G 
22:\. Elk Grove Unified Sc_;h. Dist. v. Nt>wdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4fi (2004) (Thomas. ,J.. 
concurring). 
22-1. ld. at HI (Rehnquist. C .• J., concurring). 
22fi. Sec Confmnation Heczring on the Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief 
.Justice of the United States: Hearing Bej(;re the 8. Comm. on the ,Judiciary, 1 09th 
Con g. :lfiH (200fi) (statement of .Judge John Roberts, Nominee to lw Chief Jus tic_;.- of the 
UnitPd States Supreme Court), available at http://frwebgatP.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
binlgPtdoc.cgi'?dbname=l09_senate_hearings&docid=f:2:lfi:19.pdf. 
22(1. Tel.; sec also Kelly St. ,John, Plcdf{e Af{ain Ruled Unconstitutional, SAK 
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Even more indicative of his views on this issue are two 
briefs Justice Roberts wrote as Deputy Solicitor General of the 
United States: an amicus brief in Lee and a brief on the merits 
in Board of Education v. Mergens. In both briefs, the Chief 
Justice urged the Court to overrule Lemon, a move that would 
indicate an abrupt change in the Supreme Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
In the Mergens brief, for example, Justice Roberts argued 
that the "Lemon test has generated results that often obfuscate 
as much as they illuminate proper action under the 
Establishment Clause."227 He then explained the impact of this 
confusion, asserting that the Lemon test "is divorced from the 
context in which it was spawned" and now actually prohibits 
"practices and traditions with ancient roots in the history and 
experience of the American people."228 Certainly the Pledge of 
Allegiance could fall within this definition. 
In the Lee v. Weisman brief, Justice Roberts argued that the 
rabbi-given prayer at a public secondary school graduation did 
not violate the Establishment Clause because it did not 
"establish any religion nor coerce nonadherents to participate 
in any religion or religious exercise against their will."229 He 
suggested that the Religion Clauses demand a "single, careful 
inquiry into whether the practice at issue provides direct 
benefits to religion in a manner that threatens the 
establishment of an official church or compels persons to 
participate in a religion or religious exercise contrary to their 
consciences."230 The Pledge of Allegiance, with its 
nondenominational reference to God, would also pass such a 
test. 
C. Justice Alita 
New Associate Justice Samuel Alito is not what one would 
call a wild card. Justice Alito would likely follow his 
predecessor's lead on the issue of the Pledge of Allegiance's 
FRA:-.JCISCO CHRO:-.J .. Sept. 15, 2005, at Al. 
227. Appellate Brief for the United States at 43, Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 
226 (1990) (No. SH-1597). 
228. Id. 
229. Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at l:l, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577 (1992) (No. 90-1014). 
2~10. Id. at 23-24. 
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constitutionality. Nicknamed "Scalito"2:31 by opponents during 
his 2005 Senate confirmation hearing, Justice Alito is likely to 
be even more opposed to a constitutional ban on the Pledge of 
Allegiance than even Justice O'Connor. 
ln a dissent he joined in American Civil Liberties Union of 
New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of 
Education,2:32 Justice Alito showed his willingness to 
distinguish Lee as a "highly fact-sensitive" decision that does 
not prescribe any "broad constitutional principle[s] which ban[] 
prayer at all high school graduation ceremonies, regardless of 
the manner in which the decision to include prayer is made or 
implemented."2:l:i The main premise of the dissent was that the 
Establishment Clause could not prohibit speech allowed by the 
Free Exercise Clause since the prayer in question was student-
led speech.2:34 
Justice Alito also showed his willingness to support even 
non-student-led religious speech on school premises in Child 
Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford 
Township School District.235 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Alito advocated a much higher threshold of coercion than 
required by the Supreme Court in Lee.2:36 He held that a 
religious group was permitted to distribute materials on 
campus as long as the students were not compelled to listen to 
the speech,237 which the Court demonstrated in Lee and Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe is nothing more than a 
subjective measure of peer pressure felt by various groups of 
students. 2:38 
As the Pledge of Allegiance policies currently being litigated 
all involve non-compulsory teacher-led and student-led speech, 
it is highly probable that Justice Alito will support a non-
compulsory Pledge of Allegiance policy that includes the phrase 
"under God." 
2:11. Cragg Him•s. 'Scalito!' Nothing is 'f~itc' About 13ush 's Newest Pick, HoUSTO~ 
C!IIWN., Nov. 1, 200G. at B9. 
2:12. H4 F.3d 1471 (:ld Cir. HHJ()). 
2:3:l. !d. at 1490 (Mansmann. C .• J.. dissenting). 
2:l4. lei. at 14H~J. 
2:JG. :lH6 F.:ld G14 Uld Cir. 2004). 
2:Hi. !d. at 5:15. 
2:37. Id. 
2:lH. Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe. n:iO U.S. 290, :311-12 (2000): Lee v. 
Weisman. 505 U.S. G77. iJ97-9H (1992). 
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D. Justice Scalia 
Although Justice Scalia recused himself in Elk Grove,'2:39 
the very reason for his recusal was his reported criticism of the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Newdow, asserting that "[t]he 
[E]stablishment [C]lause was once well understood not to 
exclude God from the public forum and political life."'240 This 
criticism of the Newdow decision, and his long-time criticisms 
of Lemon and other Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
suggests that he would very likely uphold the constitutionality 
of the Pledge of Allegiance. 
Little doubt can exist that Justice Scalia would turn the 
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence on its head if 
given the chance. In McCreary County, Kentucky v. American 
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, the Court ruled that a 
county courthouse could not display the Ten 
Commandments.241 In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that 
the "Court's oft repeated assertion that the government cannot 
favor religious practice is false."242 Assuming he takes part in 
a future pledge case, it is quite certain that Justice Scalia will 
side with the Pledge of Allegiance as a constitutionally valid 
exercise. 
E. Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg would all 
probably rule against the Pledge of Allegiance. Commonly 
considered as the Court's most liberal justices, 243 these four 
have maintained their solidarity when it comes to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In every published 
Supreme Court opinion involving the Establishment Clause in 
the past three years, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg have each maintained a consistent track record of 
239. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. l. 18 (2004) 
240. Pamela Gould, Reli;;ious Freedom Pruiscd, FHEE L\~('1•:-S·L'-.R. ,Jan. 13, 200:1. 
a.r•allabl<' at http:l/fredericksburg.com/News/FT,S/9111200:o!Ol200:J/Oll:J200:o/R4();)fj7. 
,Justice Scalia offmed his criticism of the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision at a 
Rt>ligious Freedom Day observance in Fredericksburg. Virginia. !d. 
241. 54fi U.S. 844, 850-51, 881 (2005). 
242. /d. at 885 (Scalia .• J., dissenting). 
243. See, e.g., David T. Canon. Hcnetcing the Voting Ri,>;hts Act: Retrogression, 
Influence, and the "Georgia v. Ashcroft Fix," 7 ELEC'TIO:\ L.J. :l, () (2008): Stephen E. 
C;ottlieb, What Federalism & Why! Science Versus Doctrine, :Jfi l'lci'P. L. REV. 47. fi8 
n.:J::l (20()7). 
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expanding the Establishment Clause's prohibitive reach. 
During oral arguments in Elk Grove, for example, Justice 
Souter said, "[T]he reference to under God means something 
more than a mere description of how somebody else once 
thought. . . . So I think, I think there's some affirmation 
there."244 
F. Justice Kennedy 
Given his mixed stances in previous Establishment Clause 
cases, Justice Kennedy is more of a wild card on this issue than 
any of the other Justices. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion in Lee, where the Court held that students in public 
schools are psychologically coerced to participate in religious 
practices when others pray at high school graduations.245 
While proponents of the Pledge of Allegiance vigorously argue 
that the recitation is not a religious exercise like prayer, even 
Justice Thomas has noted the difficulty in squaring Justice 
Kennedy's Lee reasoning with voluntary recitations of the 
Pledge of Allegiance.246 Opponents of the Pledge may argue 
that students are coerced to participate, even though the 
policies expressly authorize only a voluntary recitation, citing 
Justice Kennedy's psychological coercion rationale as a 
controlling point of law mandating the Court to hold the Pledge 
of Allegiance unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Despite his opinion in Lee, Justice Kennedy's positions in 
later Establishment Clause cases would seem to favor 
upholding the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance. In 
McCreary County, Justice Kennedy joined parts of Justice 
Scalia's dissenting opinion (1) acknowledging the role of 
religion in America's heritage247 and (2) arguing that the 
Lemon test has simply been manipulated to fit "the Court's 
hostility to religion."248 This second point argues that if 
Lemon's purpose prong is not to be completely done away with, 
244. Transcript of Oral Argument at :o8<l9, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow. fi42 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624). 
245. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
246. ~;]k Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, ,J., 
concurring). 
24 7. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 906 (2005) (Scalia, ,J., 
dissenting). 
248. !d. at 900. 
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it must at least be used as intended-to examme the 
legislature's purpose and not a third party's perception of that 
purpose. Along these lines, one could easily argue that both the 
text of the Pledge and its codification by Congress in 1954 
merely acknowledges the role of deity in the founding of the 
United States and nothing more. Such a reading of the Pledge 
of Allegiance could lead Justice Kennedy to uphold its 
constitutionality. 
In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice Kennedy was part of a 
plurality that held that the Establishment Clause allowed the 
display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol 
grounds.249 He joined the plurality opinion, which stated that 
"[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message 
consistent with religious doctrine does not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause."250 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Justice Kennedy joined 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Thomas, in ruling that Ohio's school voucher program did not 
offend the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment251-
even though the Court noted that ninety-six percent of the 
beneficiaries' children attended religious schools.252 The Court 
held that the Establishment Clause prevents states from 
passing legislation that has the "'purpose' or 'effect' of 
advancing or inhibiting religion."253 Since the Ohio law in 
question did not advance or inhibit any particular religion, the 
Court ruled that it did not offend the Establishment Clause.254 
Similarly, one could argue that the Pledge's generic reference 
to God does not advance or inhibit any particular religion, thus 
preserving its constitutionality. 
Based on his more recent Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy is probably less likely to make 
a blanket ruling against the Pledge and Congress's 1954 
amendment to its text-his chosen application of coercion, 
however, will guide his decision about the constitutionality of 
policies of teacher-led recitations of the Pledge in public 
schools. While it may appear that Justice Kennedy's 
249. i'i4i'i U.S. fi/7. G91-92 (2005). 
250. Id. at G90. 
251. 5:36 U.S. G:l9. fiG2-fi:) (2002). 
252. I d. at G4 7. 
253. /d. nt fi4H-49 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. :20:3, 222-2:3 (1997)). 
254. I d. at GG2- fi:l. 
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence is contradictory, his 
discreet, regular practice of distinguishing facts may explain 
the facial discrepancies. It is apparent that if Justice Kennedy 
wants to side with the Pledge policy on the merits of the 
constitutional issue, he will be forced to either vote to overrule 
his own opinion in Lee, or follow the alternative endorsement 
test for applicability of Lee described by Justice O'Connor in 
her Elk Graue concurrence, as discussed above. 
Given his particular aptitude for distinguishing 
Establishment Clause cases, Justice Kennedy's disposition in a 
Pledge case will likely be more fact-sensitive than his 
colleagues on the Court. While all of the justices make fact-
based judgments in their decisions, Justice Kennedy appears 
less invested in one particular Establishment Clause ideology 
over another. As discussed above, Newdow's present challenge 
claims a more tangentially-related injury that may be more 
easily distinguished than the facts in Elk Graue, which claimed 
a more causal relationship between the injury and the 
government action. 
In light of the facts in the latest Newdaw case, Justice 
Kennedy may have an easier time joining an opinion that 
upholds the constitutionality of the district's Pledge policy 
because coercion is more difficult to demonstrate where its 
effects resulted in no injury. Where a causal relationship is 
more apparent between the language of the Pledge and the 
litigant's injury, however, an argument that the Pledge's 
language is akin to the prayer in Lee may allow Justice 
Kennedy to more easily adopt a Lee approach to the subtle 
coercion of peer pressure and ridicule, which may lead to 
striking down the Pledge policy. 
Therefore, Justice Kennedy's decision will depend on 
Newdow's depiction of the injury caused by the Pledge. If 
Justice Kennedy can be persuaded that the recitation of the 
Pledge caused the injury claimed to the plaintiffs minor 
children, he will likely adhere to his earlier coercion test. In 
short, while Justice Kennedy may side with the Pledge in the 
context of a congressional act, he is less likely to do so when 
injury results due to the Pledge's recitation at school. That is, 
while he will not likely strike down the Pledge as inherently 
violative of the Establishment Clause, he is less likely to 
approve a school policy that orchestrates teacher-led recitations 
of the Pledge in a public school, which is subject to compulsory 
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attendance laws, when that policy causes a remediable injury 
to a student. That causal relationship would more fully support 
a Lee coercion application, whereas tangentially-related 
injuries do not invoke the same level of coercion. Accordingly, 
where a causal relationship is not clearly established, or where 
an adoption of ,Justice O'Connor's endorsement test precludes a 
coercion analysis, the Pledge of Allegiance will carry the day. 
G. Final Vote Verdict 
Ultimately, a case challenging the constitutionality of the 
Pledge of Allegiance will likely result in a 5-4 split decision. For 
the reasons stated above, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia will all likely rule that school 
districts' policies allowing for the voluntary recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance do not offend the Establishment Clause. 
Conversely, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg 
would all likely rule that the Pledge of Allegiance docs offend 
the Establishment Clause and that Lee and Lemon operate as 
precedent to support their striking down the Pledge of 
Allegiance. This establishes the more easily predicted 4-4 
divide on the Court. 
,Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, will most likely he the 
swing vote. If he adheres to his earlier coercion rationale in 
Lee, he will likely side with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, 
and Ginsburg, giving them a fifth vote against a Pledge-
recitation policy. Alternatively, if Justice Kennedy follows 
,Justice O'Connor's more benign endorsement test, which would 
preclude a kinship between the prayer in Lee and the Pledge; 
or if he distinguishes the latest Newdow facts from the 
offending facts in Lee, which would preclude a causal 
relationship between the Pledge recitation and the injury; or if 
he succumbs to public opinion and congressional ire, ,Justice 
Kennedy could just as easily vote alongside Justices Roberts, 
Alito, Thomas, and Scalia. 
Facially, it seems too close to call; the magnitude of his Lee 
decision, however, lends itself best to the conclusion that 
Justice Kennedy will most likely serve as the fifth vote m 
opposition to the Pledge of Allegiance's constitutionality as 
presently practiced in many public schools. 
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VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLEDGE 
The Pledge of Allegiance itself, as amended in 1954, is 
constitutional.255 Furthermore, a public school policy 
mandating voluntary daily teacher-led recitations of the Pledge 
of Allegiance does not offend the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. The constitutional innocence of the Pledge is 
maintained for three primary reasons. First, the Pledge is not 
religious speech, but merely an appeal to the historical context 
under which this nation was founded and constitutes only 
ceremonial deism. Second, voluntary teacher-led recitations of 
the Pledge cannot constitute coercion or compulsion. By its own 
terms, it is a voluntary act and no assertion of peer pressure 
from other students can equate to coercion by the government. 
Third, even if the Pledge is determined to contain "religious 
speech," it is de minimis and merely acknowledges the 
principles of the very fabric of our American society. Even 
assuming arguendo that the Pledge is religious speech, it must 
then necessarily follow that the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment protects the voluntary recitation of such 
speech by willing students. 
The Pledge of Allegiance is a pledge to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States and the freedoms guaranteed 
to her citizens by virtue of the sacrifice and perseverance of 
forefathers who secured those freedoms. One such freedom is 
the freedom of speech, which includes a freedom "not to speak 
at all."256 As such, any Pledge recitation must be voluntary 
and not compelled by the government under threat of force or 
law. 
The primary effect of the adoption of the Pledge of 
Allegiance and its recitation in public schools is not to advance 
religion, but to instill in young minds an acknowledgment of 
the American heritage and the freedoms represented by the 
Flag of the United States. By adopting the Pledge of Allegiance, 
including the de minimis reference to "God," the government 
265. This conclusion and the other arguments presented in this section are largely 
attributable to the Elk Grove concurrences. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J .. concurring); id. at :l::l (O'Connor. ,J.. concurring); 
id. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring). Any errors, however, in portraying these arguments 
are mine alone. 
256. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550, 572 n.2 (2005) (citing Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 4 71 U.S. 5:19, 559 (19H5)). 
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has not endorsed any religion. The Pledge is not religious 
speech since the reference to God is nothing more than a 
reference to ceremonial deism as described by Justice O'Connor 
in her Elk Grove concurrence. It has not been canonized by any 
religion, nor does any religion claim or enjoy preferential 
reference based on its recitation. 
The use of the word "God" in the Pledge is a generic one and 
can mean a number of different things to a number of different 
people. It does not say one nation under Jesus, or under 
Vishnu, or Allah, or Buddha, but one nation under "God." This 
reference is an example of ceremonial deism in a patriotic 
observance, similar to the Declaration of Independence, Star-
Spangled Banner, and the Gettysburg Address. The Pledge of 
Allegiance does not have the purpose or the effect of showing 
that the government favors or prefers any particular 
established religion. 
The Pledge of Allegiance and its recitation in public schools 
also fails to meet the coercion test. In adherence to the Barnette 
mandate, Pledge policies in force today are voluntary in nature. 
Students have the choice whether to participate and those who 
choose not to participate are not compelled to do so by threat of 
force or law: they are not expelled, detained, fined, and their 
parents are not prosecuted, as was the case in Barnette.257 
Students legitimately have the choice to participate or to sit or 
stand respectively without pledging their allegiance to the flag. 
A. Coercion 
The legal implications of the word "coercion" is another 
paramount issue that has been perverted by inconsistent use in 
Supreme Court decisions. Unlike Barnette, students are not 
threatened with discipline for abstaining from pledging their 
allegiance in voluntary pledge policies. In the context of the 
Pledge, the Court must determinatively settle the definition of 
" . " coerciOn. 
Lee is the epitome of exemplary cases of coercion 
misapplication. The Court held that psychological coercion was 
present in Lee because high school graduation cannot 
practically be viewed as voluntary due to the high level of 
importance placed on it by society.258 Some may assert that 
257. W.Va. State~ Bel. of Educ. v. Barnette. 319 U.S. G24. G29 (194:)). 
258. Jd. 
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compulsory education laws present a prima facie case for 
coercion in school-led activities. In adherence to Barnette, 
states cannot compel students to pledge their allegiance to the 
flag of the United States and modern Pledge policies recognize 
this. Can peer pressure constitute government-induced 
coercwn, however? Does invoking Lee-like psychological peer 
pressure arguments elevate classmate peer pressure to the 
level of government-induced coercion when students feel 
embarrassed or ashamed when abstaining from pledging their 
allegiance to the flag? The fine line between what constitutes 
coercion and what does not begs the question, does the "[l]aw 
reach[] past formalism"?259 Pressure from peers towards 
conformity is not grounds for coercion. The Court has never 
accepted the "follow the leader" rationale or the "he told me to 
jump off the bridge" defense in our legal system. 
Justice Thomas correctly stated, "[E]ven if we assume that 
sitting in respectful silence could be mistahen for assent to or 
participation in a graduation prayer, dissenting students 
graduating from high school are not 'coerced' to pray. At most, 
they are 'coerced' into possibly appearing to assent to the 
prayer."260 Equally applicable, it must follow that students are 
at most coerced into possibly appearing to assent to the Pledge 
of Allegiance. This is insufficient. 
B. Public Policy Perspective and "God" 
According to a recent Gallup poll, more than ninety percent 
of Americans believe in "God."261 This is why <Justice O'Connor 
saw the need to recognize ceremonial deism in civic life. The 
reference to "God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is merely a 
reference to what Justice O'Connor calls ceremonial deism. 
1. Unintended consequences 
Similar to Congress's observation in its reaffirmation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance, striking down the Pledge would be, in 
259. L~c 505 U.S. at il9G. 
260. Elk Gran• Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. L 17 (:2004) (Thomas .. J .. 
concurring). 
261. Frank Nt>wport, Who Belieues in God and Who /Jol's/1 'fl. (;,\LLLP :--IE\\',; 
SERVICE, June 2:1, 200G, cwailahle at http://www.gallup.com/poll/:2:l470/Who- Beliews-
God-Who-Doesnt.aspx (stating that "[i]f Americans are simply askPd if' they believe in 
God or a universal spirit., more than 90%, will say yes"). 
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effect, a mandatory precedent that would dictate the 
elimination of our national motto, "In God We Trust," and its 
removal from our currency. It would also dictate the removal of 
the Declaration of Independence from the Library of Congress 
and our schools and the destruction of the Lincoln monument, 
which bears the text of the Gettysburg Address on its walls. 
Necessarily, it would also require the removal of the text of the 
Constitution of the United States from every courthouse, 
classroom, and library with the strict admonition that the 
Constitution not be read in schools lest the state "coerce" a 
belief in God as the Constitution uses an even less generic 
reference to deity in Article VII: "Year of our Lord."262 
Eliminating these fundamental pillars of our nation's founding 
and tradition will lead clown a slippery slope that will threaten 
the very fabric that makes up the ideals of liberty that bind 
this nation together. 
VIII. CONCLUSiON 
The Pledge of Allegiance was written and adopted as a 
patriotic observance for the 400th anniversary of Christopher 
Columbus's landing in the Americas. It was meant as a 
patriotic observance to honor the heritage of the Nation and 
was inspired by the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, and the Gettysburg Address, to name a few. 
The Court held that students cannot be forced to pledge 
their allegiance, but pledge policies today call for the voluntary 
recitation of the Pledge. Opponents of the Pledge, such as 
Michael Newdow, claim that the 1954 Act of Congress, in 
which it added the phrase "under God," qualified the Pledge as 
religious speech and is a violation of the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. 
Thus, the questions that must be answered by the Court 
are two-fold: 1) is the Pledge of Allegiance religious speech, and 
2) does the Pledge of Allegiance compel the affirmation of a 
religious belief in God? The Court is likely to be called upon in 
the very near future to consider Newdow's latest lawsuit 
challenging the Pledge's constitutionality. The current Court, 
with the substitution of two outspoken Pledge proponents, is in 
a deadlock that will likely be decided by a 5-4 vote with Justice 
:2fi:2. US. COC-JO'T a1·t. 7. 'I 2. 
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Kennedy serving as the swing vote. 
The Chief Justice, as well as Justices Scalia, Alito, and 
Thomas will all likely vote in favor of a voluntary Pledge policy 
and may even vote to reverse current Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence by voting to overrule Lemon and Lee. Justices 
Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens will most likely vote 
against the Pledge. Their voting record in Establishment 
Clause cases indicates that they would prefer to uphold the 
Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including 
Lee and Lemon. 
Justice Kennedy, although the author of Lee, has shown 
considerable willingness to view the Establishment Clause in a 
light favorable to the Pledge of Allegiance, but his Lee opinion 
overshadows an inclination to completely dismiss his strict, 
although misapplied, concept of coercion. Most indicators, 
however, suggest that while Justice Kennedy may vote to 
strike down a teacher-led Pledge policy as coercive, he is 
unlikely to kill the Pledge of Allegiance itself. Notwithstanding, 
no one is putting a surprise switch beyond Justice Kennedy, 
who is clearly uninterested in committing himself to one side or 
the other before considering the matter in its entirety. 
Brian Wheeler 
